Abstract-We describe a novel method for over-the-air automated authentication and verification of machine-to-machine (M2M) wireless sensor networks using the existing authentication assets of a cellular telecom operator. We extend the standard Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) provided in the 3GPP specifications to implement our solution with minimal additional hardware and software requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine-to-Machine communication is among the fastest growing telecom business segments, with double-digit growth predicted for the next several years. Wireless sensors are the primary drivers of M2M communication as they are being deployed in large numbers for applications like smart metering, car-to-car communication, health monitoring, security systems and industrial automation. Due to the sensitive nature of these applications, wireless sensor network (WSN) standards such as Zigbee [1] specify security profiles for providing device authentication, message integrity and cryptographic data security. A coordinator node in the sensor network usually serves as the security key repository for all Zigbee nodes in the network and maintains access control lists of the Zigbee network, in addition to performing gateway and data aggregation functions, for example, by connecting the Zigbee network to the Internet. Fig. 1 shows a possible deployment scenario of connecting the a Zigbee WSN to the Internet via the coordinator node. The Zigbee security model assumes that the coordinator node is secure and authenticated via some outof-band mechanism. In our work we focus on verifying the authenticity of this coordinator node.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we highlight the key context and contributions of this paper. In Section III we briefly describe the relevant parts of GBA and Zigbee standards that are most relevant to our work. We also enumerate the cellular network components relevant to our solution. Our solution for verifying and authenticating the Zigbee coordinator node is presented in Section IV. Conclusions and future work is provided in Section V. A list of abbreviations is provided at the end of this paper.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS AND SCOPE
We describe a novel method of over-the-air authentication and verification of the Zigbee coordinator node using the authentication assets of a cellular telecom operator. In particular, we show how we can adapt the standards-based Generic Bootup Architecture (GBA) [2] functionality of operator networks in order to authenticate the software and state (e.g. access control lists, shared keys, etc.) of the coordinator node when it boots up. The GBA adapts the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) [4] shared-key algorithms (originally created for authenticating cellular phone users using the usual SIM card and PIN combination), for creating a shared session key between client software running on the user equipment (e.g. Zigbee coordinator node) and a (operator-trusted) Network Application Function server, which could be a third-party application server controlling the Zigbee coordinator node remotely.
GBA provides two services-it authenticates the user equipment to the operator network and it creates a shared session key that can be used for secure communication between the user equipment and the network application function server. GBA has been demonstrated as an effective replacement for the user login-password authentication mechanism used on the Internet, for example, to log into a website. But its application in verifying the software and state integrity of a Zigbee coordinator node is non-trivial because the coordinator functionality is implemented as an independent software and hardware module, whereas GBA only authenticates the SIM card and software client invoking the AKA algorithm. Simply verifying the SIM and the client is not sufficient to verify that the Zigbee coordinator's software or running state has not been maliciously compromised.
We envision a scenario in which the Zigbee WSN is periodically shutdown and then restarted using a remote interface to the coordinator/cellular gateway over the cellular operator's network. It is necessary to verify that the coordinator's state and its software have not been compromised since the last shutdown. For example, an adversary could substitute the original coordinator with her own coordinator by stealing the SIM card in the original device and installing it in another (malicious) device. In order to defeat this attack, the integrity of the coordinator has to be tested and verified against a safelystored signature that represents the digest of the correct state and software of the authenticated coordinator. This signature mechanism should preferably be deployable with minimal need for modifications to the operators infrastructure or any hardware additions to the coordinator/cellular gateway. In addition, it should be completely compatible with the standard GBA authentication mechanism.
III. BACKGROUND
Our aim is to fuse network operator-class security, provided via the authentication and verification algorithms of cellular network standards, with the security built into Zigbee wireless sensor networks. The Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA), provides access to the operator's authentication and verification mechanisms. Zigbee security is based upon shared secret keys between the coordinator node and other wireless sensor nodes. We briefly describe GBA and Zigbee security in this section.
A. Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GBA [2] is part of the 3GPP standard [3] for deriving authentication and key agreement for applications from the 3GPP AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) mechanisms. Thus applications running on the UE (user equipment) can establish a secure channel to an application server in the network via GBA.
GBA authentication is based on a permanent secret shared between the UE's Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), for example SIM card, and the the corresponding user's profile information stored within the cellular operator's Home Subscriber System (HSS) database. The permanent secret is used to generate a time-limited secure key on the UE and this same key is also generated by the network operator and distributed to the application server. In this way a secure communication channel is established between the UE and application server.
In this Section we provide a general description of algorithms behind GBA. A specific implementation of this algorithm suited to our proposed solution will be described in Section IV. process. The user equipment (UE) is the coordinator software running on the coordinator/cellular gateway. The network operator is usually the cellular network operator with the requisite authentication components and databases. Finally, the application server is the the remote application server controlling the coordinator. The steps to setup a secure channel between the UE and the application server, as enumerated in the Fig. 2 , are as follows:
1) The UE identifies itself to the network operator and requests authentication. 2) The network operator reciprocates with a challenge to the UE; this challenge is only solvable based on the shared secret between the UE and the network. 3) The UE solves the challenge and sends it back to the network operator. 4) After verifying the correctness of this response the network operator returns a time-limited key and session id to the UE. The UE is now authenticated with the network operator and has obtained a key that can be used as the basis of setting up a secure communication with the application server. 5) The UE next requests the application server for secure communication, providing the session id obtained in
Step 4 as proof of being authenticated. 6) The application server uses the session id to obtain the time-limited key of Step 4 from the network operator. 7) Prior to revealing the information requested in Step 6, the network operator usually authenticates the application server. The network operator then transmits the time-limited key to the application server. 8) The application server responds to the UE and initiates secure communication with the UE using the time limited key for encryption. After the successful run of the above process both the UE and the application server share the time-limited key, which can be used as the basis of setting up a secure communication channel. In our solution we use this secure channel for further verification of the Zigbee coordinator's software and state information.
B. Zigbee Security
The Zigbee standard [1] defines a set of protocols for establishing two-way communication between sensor devices. Given that many sensor devices are low-cost, battery-operated, CPU constrained, and intermittently connected over lowbandwidth and unreliable wireless links, Zigbee seeks to minimize hardware costs and lower power-consumption for wireless communication. These design goals behind Zigbee have made it the most ubiquitous wireless sensor communication protocol stack; as of this writing, the Zigbee protocol has been implemented in several million wireless sensor nodes being deployed for applications ranging from environmental monitoring to energy metering in homes.
Many Zigbee applications require secure handling of sensitive data. For this purpose several security features are defined within the Zigbee stack. Key establishment, key maintenance, packet encryption and sensor nodes' access control are some of the security facilities available through the Zigbee protocol. The security is based on shared-key algorithms and a special node, designated the 'coordinator', is assumed to be a trusted entity. The whole sensor network security's is derived from this assumption. The coordinator assumes the role of the trust center in a Zigbee network. This role entails master key management (generating, storing, disseminating and negotiating different keys with other Zigbee sensor nodes) and access control (controlling which Zigbee sensor nodes are allowed to join the network).
In our work we establish ways of verifying the authenticity of the coordinator node when the sensor network is booted up.
C. Network Components
We now describe the network components needed for the proposed solution. These network components, along with their domains and relationships, are depicted in the figure 3.
Coordinator node
The role of the coordinator node (CN) is to secure the Zigbee network infrastructure and securely connect to the Internet. Because we use GBA algorithms, the CN must support HTTP digest AKA protocol. In addition, the CN requires the capability of using USIM information for bootstrapping and supporting any NAF-specific application protocol. The USIM application resides on UICC smart-card interface and contains the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), Authentication key (ki), and two passwords (called the PIN and the PUK). 
Bootstrapping Server Function
A generic Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) mutually authenticates the coordinator node using the AKA protocol, and orchestrates the agreement on session keys that are used for further communication between the CN and a Network Application Function (NAF). The BSF is a network element deployed in mobile network operator's environment and is assumed to be reliable and secure.
Network Application Function
Network Application Function (NAF) communicates with the CN using an application specific protocol (this can be unique to different applications). For example, the NAF could be extended into the M2M server controlling the CN and/or may belong to third parties. Session keys generated after the bootstrapping procedure between the CN and BSF are used by the NAF to communicate with the CN.
Home Subscriber Server (HSS)
Home subscriber server is used to store the set of all user settings (USS), also referred to as GUSS. The HSS may contain multiple GUSSs that can be mapped to one more more private identities such as IMSI. It should follow the GBA requirements as stated in [2] .
GBA Reference Points
The reference points Ub, Ua, Zh and Zn, marked in Fig. 3 , are the interfaces used to establish a communication channel between the network components such as BSF, NAF etc. These are described below:
• Ub: The reference point Ub resides in between the CN and the BSF and provides mutual authentication between the CN and the BSF. The CN utilizes Ub to bootstrap the session keys based on 3GPP AKA infrastructure [4] . The HTTP Digest AKA protocol [5] is used on the Ub reference point. This protocol is based on the 3GPP AKA protocol.
• Ua: The Ua interface provides the application protocol. It is secured using the keys agreed between the CN and the BSF after running the HTTP Digest AKA procedure over the Ub reference point.
• Zh: Zh is used between the HSS and the BSF. The HSS provides the required authentication information and all the GBA user security settings to the BSF using the Zh reference point.
• Zn: The NAF uses the Zn reference point to fetch the key material that was agreed during the previous run of the HTTP Digest AKA protocol over reference point Ub.
IV. AUTHENTICATION AND VERIFICATION OF THE COORDINATOR NODE
In this section, we describe the use of GBA architecture to authenticate the coordinator node (CN) to the cellular operator and also provide a method to verify that the CNs state has not been tampered with since its last shut-down. Our method is divided into two procedures: bootstrapping authentication using GBA and subsequent bootstrapping usage. In the first procedure, the CN authenticate itself to the cellular operator and derives key material. This shared key material is then used to securing the subsequent communication between the CN and the M2M Server.
A. Bootstrapping Authentication procedure
The CN initiates communication with a NAF over the Ua interface. If the initial request from the CN does not contain any GBA related parameters then the NAF replies with a bootstrap initiation 'suggestion' message. Ideally the CN should then perform a bootstrapping authentication procedure. In addition, the CN performs the bootstrapping authentication procedure when it receives a bootstrapping re-negotiation indication message from the NAF or when the lifetime of the shared key being used for communication with the NAF or M2M server expires. The basic authentication protocol is described in the Table I . The procedure is explained as follows :
1) The CN sends a request message along with own identity to the NAF. This unique identity is provided by IMSI, usually stored in the SIM or similar hardware module.
(Denoted CN → NAF : Request in Table I) 2) The NAF sends a bootstrap initiation request message to the CN. Note that if the NAF receives GBA-related parameters in the first message, it does not request the CN to perform the bootstrap authentication procedure because the CN already has the relevant key material. 3) The CN sends an HTTP request message to the BSF using the HTTP Digest AKA protocol. This request message contains the IMSI or the TMSI to provide its identity. 4) The BSF checks the received credentials and locates the CN profile. If the message from the CN contains a TMSI, the BSF checks its local database to find the related CN profile. If the message contains an IMSI, the BSF retrieves the complete set of GBA user settings and containing the B-TID value and the lifetime of key Ks. 11) Both the CN and the BSF derive two NAF-specific keys Ks ext NAF and Ks int NAF by using the key Ks. These two NAF-specific keys are used to secure the communication over the Ua reference point. 12) The CN and BSF store the key Ks with associated B-TID, and this is used for further communication with the NAF. In order to derive the keys K s and K S N AF , the key derivation function (KDF) described in detail in [2] is used. The RAND (random number), IMSI, gba-me and NAF ID are the parameters used to derive the key Ks NAF. The KDF must be implemented in the Zigbee coordinator node. The NAF ID is generated by concatenating the Ua security protocol along with the full DNS name. After the initial authentication based on IMSI, the NAF issues a TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) to be used for subsequent identifications. The TMSI is a local identifier, and provides confidentiality against identity and location tracking.
B. Verification of Coordinator Node
We present a method to verify the coordinator's state after the successful authentication of the CN to the home operator. The CN agrees to use GBA and starts communicating with the NAF over the interface Ua. The key Ks generated from the bootstrapping authentication procedure can be used to derive a key Ks NAF by the CN [2] . This method is described as follows and depicted in Table II: 1) The CN sends a message to the NAF, containing B-TID value and a encrypted M2M application data. The encrypted data contains coordinator node ID (CN ID) , B-TID, a set of state identification parameters (S), and a nonce (A). It is encrypted using a key Ks NAF. 2) The NAF requests key material associated with the B-TID to the BSF over the interface Ua.
3) The BSF receives B-TID and then derives the keys from the key Ks and the key derivation parameters as described in [2] . It sends a message to the NAF, containing the requested key Ks NAF, bootstrapping time, lifetime of the key, and NAF specific USSs. The BSF also sends IMSI to the NAF. 4) After receiving a key Ks NAF associated with the B-TID, the NAF can decrypt the message received from the CN. It decrypts the message and forwards CN ID, B-TID, S, and A to the M2M server. 5) The M2M server checks S and replies back to NAF with the response, containing CN ID, B-TID, S-OK, and A-1. 6) The NAF encrypts the last message using the key Ks NAF and sends this to the CN. 7) Coordinator node starts subsequent application-specific communication (after receiving S-OK message from the M2M server). Note that S is a set of different parameters and state variables such as the M2M application software running on the CN, the access control list of the Zigbee network, memory state, and the shared keys (Zigbee) and it is computed locally on the CN. In our model we assume that the attacker does not have an unauthorized access to the CN to download these parameters and state variables when the CN is in an authenticated state. The NAF handles encryption and decryption process as described the above. An additional software application will be required at the NAF to handle the cryptographic functions and forwarding to the CN and the M2M server. It can be argued that this technique is not feasible in the roaming scenario. It is possible to forward encrypted messages from the CN directly to the M2M server. However, then the M2M server requires functionality to fetch the related key ks NAF from the BSF and this may be non-trivial for the mobile operator.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK We have provided a simple and elegant technique of using the an operator's security assets for verifying WSNs. Our solution verifies not only the SIM card, but the WSN's coordinator state. This aspect is very important because WSNs are deployed in remote locations, often devoid of physical security, and so any malicious user can easily steal the SIM card and substitute the original coordinator with a malicious device containing the original SIM.
While we have explained our solution using Zigbee as an example, our solution is equally valid for other M2M and sensor network standards. One of the key benefits of our approach is that it eschews expensive add-ons to existing operator infrastructure and yet addresses the key concern of checking the integrity of remotely deployed WSNs. An open question that we are investigating is to describe which parts of the Zigbee state and coordinator memory map can be used as seeds for the hash function used in our approach.We continue to study the practical validity of the proposed approach, including the security properties, computational overhead, and scalability issues while using GBA for M2M verification.
